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Abstract:
In previous work (Clemens and Wither, 2014), we reported evidence that minimum
wage increases contributed to declines in low-skilled individuals’ employment during
the Great Recession. Because this work has generated both interest and disagreement,
we use the current paper to present the code underlying our baseline estimates and to
present supplemental results. Our supplemental analysis focuses on choices that arise
when processing wage and earnings data from the Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation to isolate samples of “low-skilled” individuals. We further assess the relevance
of several alternative approaches to sample selection. We show that these data process-
ing and sample selection margins have little effect on the qualitative implications of our
estimates. We present additional evidence that minimum wage increases had a negative
effect on employment entry among individuals who were unemployed throughout our
baseline period.
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In a recent working paper (Clemens and Wither, 2014), we reported evidence that
federal minimum wage increases contributed to employment declines among relatively
low-skilled individuals during the Great Recession. Our estimates made use of the
fact that this period’s minimum wage changes were differentially binding across states.
Using the 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), we analyzed samples
of individuals that we identified as being low skilled on the basis of their wage histories
over the year preceding the federal minimum wage’s rise from $6.55 to $7.25.
Our identification of low-skilled individuals on the basis of their wage histories
complements the minimum wage literature’s standard focus on employment among
teenagers or in the fast food industry. This approach has three primary benefits rela-
tive to standard approaches. First, it introduces the possibility of isolating an intensively
affected sample, which can aid with precision.1 Second, it makes it possible to analyze
low-skilled individuals across all ages and industries, which is relevant to external va-
lidity. Third, it enables us to longitudinally track a minimum wage changes’ effects on
individuals’ medium-run earnings trajectories.
While our use of wage histories has benefits, it is by no means without challenges.
This paper elaborates upon and investigates the relevance of several issues that arise
when implementing our approach. A first issue involves the construction of the average
baseline wage variable along which we select our analysis sample. We discuss coding
choices that shape the extent to which our “low-skilled” designation incorporates wage
rates imputed on the basis of self reported earnings and hours in addition to the wage
1Note that this benefit will materialize to a much greater degree in the current setting, where inflation
and productivity growth were low, than in settings where inflation and productivity growth are rapid.
Linneman (1982) provides an early example of analysis that accounts for the fact that counterfactual
wage growth due to inflation and productivity growth will affect the degree to which a minimum wage
change is binding. As the current project has developed, we have used baseline wage distributions,
inflation data, and productivity data to elaborate on this point. See, for example, the wage distributions
presented and discussed in Clemens (2015) and in a September 2016 revision of (Clemens and Wither,
2014), which can be found at the following link: http://econweb.ucsd.edu/˜j1clemens/pdfs/
ClemensWitherMinimumWageGreatRecession.pdf.
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rates reported by individuals who are paid on an hourly basis. We observe that the
SIPP’s wage and earnings variables make the coding of this information somewhat less
obvious than one might expect. We thus present the code underlying three alternative
approaches to constructing individuals’ baseline wage histories, along with the results
we obtain when using each of these approaches to select our analysis sample.
The second issue we address involves the manner in which we use baseline wage
data to divide the sample into the “low-skilled” and “higher-skilled” groups on which
we estimate our regression specifications. In Clemens and Wither (2014), our approach
was to analyze samples of workers with average baseline wage rates lower than $7.50.
A potential concern with this approach relates to the fact that some states had baseline
minimum wage rates in excess of $7.50. In California and Massachusetts, for example,
the minimum wage was $8.00 over the entirety of our SIPP sample. Consequently, our
baseline “control” group consists disproportionately of sub-minimum wage (e.g., tipped)
workers. This raises the possibility that individuals in the treatment and control groups
may differ from one another in ways that are relevant to their employment trajectories.
We provide evidence on this concern’s relevance by considering two alternatives to
selecting samples on the basis of a common nominal cutoff. One alternative is to select
samples based on the relationship between individuals’ average baseline wage rates and
the minimum wage rates applicable in their respective states. A second alternative is
to select samples on the basis of individuals’ percentiles in their respective wage distri-
butions. We show that the samples selected on these bases are relatively well balanced
with regards to the fraction of individuals earning less than the minimum wage. We
then show that selecting samples on these bases has little effect on our estimates.
A separate issue involves the margins that we are able to analyze using our approach.
Our baseline analysis sample consists of individuals who were employed at baseline.
Estimates involving such samples will detect changes in employment exit but may fail
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to capture changes in employment entry. Addressing the entry margin requires analysis
of individuals who were unemployed at baseline. While our original working paper
included an analysis of such individuals, it was presented in an appendix. We use the
current paper to further develop this analysis and present it more prominently. The data
provide evidence that entry was moderately reduced by the minimum wage increases
under analysis.
Our analysis of individuals who lacked employment at baseline helps us to resolve an
additional potential concern involving sample composition. Differences in states’ base-
line minimum wage rates may alter selection into employment. This raises a potential
concern because our low-skilled group consists of individuals who were employed for at
least one month at baseline. Consequently, our sample selection procedure involves an
employment margin that might be affected by differences in states’ baseline minimum
wage rates. This would bias our estimates if it translates into differences in the average
treatment and control group individuals’ counterfactual employment trajectories. We
address this concern by analyzing samples that contain both the individuals with low
baseline wage rates and the individuals who lacked employment at baseline.
A final issue involves a combination of panel balance and sample attrition. Substan-
tial attrition occurred over the course of the 2008 SIPP panel. As a baseline panel balance
criterion, we required that an individual appear in the sample for at least 36 of the 48
months that our analysis spans. In the space below, we show that our results are not
sensitive to alternative criteria including 12 months, 24 months, or a fully balanced panel
of 48 months. We show further that attrition patterns are very weakly correlated with
the employment declines we estimate.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides an overview
of the empirical setting and basic estimation framework. Section 2 discusses alternative
sample construction procedures. Section 3 discusses alternative approaches to defining
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the “target” sample. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics on the alternative analy-
sis samples. Section 5 presents regression analysis on the alternative analysis samples.
Finally, section 6 offers concluding remarks.
1 An Overview of the Empirical Setting
This section provides an overview of our empirical setting. Section 1.1 briefly de-
scribes the minimum wage changes under analysis. Section 1.2 presents our basic strat-
egy for estimating the effects of the federal minimum wage’s rise from $6.55 to $7.25.
Section 1.3 presents the unadjusted employment tabulations that underlie our estimates.
Section 1.4 discusses two distinct sets of threats to using the unadjusted data presented
in section 1.3 to directly infer the effects of this period’s minimum wage increases. The
first set of threats involves omitted variables concerns linked to the forces underlying the
Great Recession. The second involves issues related to the composition of the sample. A
more complete description of the setting can be found in Clemens and Wither (2014).
1.1 Minimum Wage Changes under Analysis
On May 25th, 2007, Congress legislated a series of increases in the federal minimum
wage. On July 24th of 2007, the minimum wage rose from $5.15 to $5.85. On July 24th
of 2008, it rose from $5.85 to $6.55. On July 24th of 2009, it rose from $6.55 to $7.25.
The original Clemens and Wither (2014) analysis uses the 2008 panel of the Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to follow the employment of low-skilled
workers as the federal minimum wage rose from $6.55 to $7.25. Because the SIPP panel
begins in the summer of 2008, it does not track individuals across the full time period
spanning the minimum wage changes’ legislation and implementation.2 Instead, the
2Additional analysis in Clemens (2015), some of which was incorporated into a September 2016 re-
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analysis uses wage data from August 2008 through July 2009 to identify low-skilled
individuals and track their employment and incomes as the July 2009 increase went into
effect.
We make use of the fact that roughly half of the U.S. states were fully bound by the
federal minimum wage’s rise from $6.55 to $7.25, while the other half were essentially
unbound. Figure 1 shows Clemens and Wither’s (2014) division of states into those
that were fully and partially bound by changes in the federal minimum wage. Figure 2
shows the time paths of the average effective minimum wage rates across these groups
of states.3 On average, the effective minimum wage rose $0.60 to $0.70 cents more in
fully bound states than in partially bound states.
1.2 Basic Estimation Framework
The basic estimation framework of Clemens and Wither (2014) is the difference-in-
differences model reproduced below:
Yi,s,t = ∑
p(t) 6=0
βp(t)Bounds × Periodp(t)
+ α1sStates + α2tTimet + α3iIndividuali
+ Xs,tγ+ Di × Trendtφ+ εi,s,t. (1)
Equation (1) includes controls for state effects, States and time effects, Timet, which
are the most basic features of difference-in-differences estimation. Because the setting
vision of Clemens and Wither (2014), uses the Current Population Survey to track employment among
individuals in demographic groups with low observable skill levels across a period that captures a truly
pre-legislation baseline.
3Both figures were initially presented in Clemens and Wither (2014).
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is longitudinal, the specification further controls for individual fixed effects, Individuali.
The vector Xs,t contains time varying controls for each state’s macroeconomic conditions.
Equation (1) allows for dynamics motivated by graphical evidence that we reported
and discussed in Clemens and Wither (2014). Specifically, we find that the prevalence of
wages between the old and new federal minimum declined rapidly beginning in April
2009. We thus code May to July 2009 as a ”Transition” period. Prior months correspond
to the baseline, or period p = 0. We code August 2009 through July 2010 as period
Post 1 and all subsequent months as period Post 2. The primary coefficients of interest
are βPost 1(t) and βPost 2(t), which are estimates of differential changes in the dependent
variable in states that were bound by the new federal minimum relative to states that
were not bound.
1.3 Evidence from Unadjusted Employment Changes
Panel A of table 1 presents tabulations of employment among individuals in the low-
skilled samples on which we focus. The 5 rows of panel A are associated with 5 alterna-
tive approaches, discussed in detail below, to identifying our target group of low-skilled
individuals. The 7 columns present the levels and changes underlying our difference-
in-differences estimation. The first 4 columns present baseline and post-implementation
employment rates in the treatment and control group. Columns 5 and 6 present changes
specific to the control group and treatment group respectively. Finally, column 7 presents
the differential employment changes that correspond to difference-in-differences esti-
mates in the absence of regression adjustment for covariates. Across the 5 samples, the
unadjusted difference-in-differences estimates range from -2.3 percentage points to -6.0
percentage points. The estimate associated with our baseline analysis sample is -4.2
percentage points.
Differences in estimates across samples are less quantitatively substantial than they
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might initially appear. This is because alternative sample selection criteria generate sam-
ples that account for varying fractions of the population of workers in states that were
bound by the minimum wage changes we analyze. As revealed by the observation counts
at the bottom of table 3, the sample associated with the estimate of -2.3 percentage points
contains the largest number of bound state individuals. Similarly, the sample associated
with the estimate of -6.0 percentage points contains the smallest number bound state
individuals. As a fraction of their respective states’ working age populations, the esti-
mated employment declines thus differ fairly modestly. This relates to a broader point,
made elsewhere by Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen (2012), that minimum wage elastici-
ties will tend to vary with the intensity with which an analysis sample’s wage rates are
affected by the minimum wage increase under analysis.4
1.4 Threats to the Basic Methodology
The primary goal of the empirical analysis is to generate evidence on the causal ef-
fect of this period’s minimum wage changes on employment. This section discusses two
distinct forms of threats to directly using the unadjusted data from panel A of table 3 to
infer the causal effects of this period’s minimum wage changes. The first involves the
possibility that variations in macroeconomic conditions are a source of omitted variables
bias. These issues received considerable attention in our original analysis as well sub-
sequent analyses (Clemens, 2017a,b), which are responsive to a comment from Zipperer
(2016). The second set of issues involves the possibility that estimates are affected by the
composition of the sample. These issue received relatively little attention in our original
analysis. The current paper brings these sample composition issues to the fore.
4Neumark (2016) nicely illustrates this point in a discussion of why it is essential to know the intensity
of a minimum wage change’s bite on a group’s wage distribution in order to determine the elasticity above
and below which a minimum wage increase’s overall effect on the group’s income will tend to be positive
or negative.
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1.4.1 Variations in Macroeconomic Conditions
Panel B of table 1 presents descriptive statistics on macroeconomic conditions across
the “treatment” and “control” groups in our analysis. The variables include a combina-
tion of macroeconomic aggregates (personal income per capita), employment aggregates
(the overall employment rate, the unemployment rate, and the prime age employment
rate) and housing market indicators (median house prices and aggregate construction
output). The data thus provide an initial look at the manner in which the unadjusted
changes presented in column 7 of panel B could plausibly be biased. Column 7 pro-
vides evidence that the forces underlying the recession were more severe in the control
states than in the treatment states. The overall employment rate declined nearly half
a percentage point less in the control states than in the treatment states, while prime
aged employment declined just over half a percentage point less. House prices declined
$17,000 less, while construction output declined roughly 3 percent less.
The SIPP sample begins mid-way through the Great Recession. Comparing the reces-
sion’s severity in the treatment states relative to the control states thus requires consider-
ing an earlier baseline. The data presented in table 2, and in figures 3, 4, and 5 enable the
relevant comparisons. Table 2 presents data on the same set of macroeconomic covari-
ates as panel B of table 1. The difference is that the baseline period for table 2 extends
from January 2006 through May 2007, which was the month during which the federal
minimum wage changes were legislated.
The data reveal that the Great Recession was significantly more severe in the states
that comprise the control group than in the states that comprise the treatment group.
Income per capita declined by just over $1,000 less in the treatment states than in the
control states. Turning to employment indicators, the table reveals that the overall em-
ployment rate declined half a percentage point less in the treatment group than in the
control group. The prime aged employment rate declined nearly a full percentage point
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less, while the unemployment rate rose just over 1 percentage point less. Turning fi-
nally to housing market indicators, median house prices declined an average of $84,000
less in the treatment group than in the control group. Figure 4 shows that construc-
tion’s share of employment in bound and unbound states moved in parallel from 2002
through 2015, while figure 5 shows that the BEA’s construction output index declined
substantially more in unbound states over the course of the recession. These macroeco-
nomic indicators, which are also presented and discussed in Clemens and Wither (2014)
and in Clemens (2017a,b), thus provide substantial direct evidence of forces that would
bias estimates towards positive values and no direct evidence of forces that would bias
estimates towards negative values.
1.4.2 Variations in Sample Composition
Estimates of βp(t) can be biased by differences in the trajectories of the treatment and
control groups’ employment probabilities that are driven by or associated with differ-
ences in the samples’ characteristics. Concerns of this sort are of interest due in part
to the nature of the natural experiment under analysis. In the setting under analysis,
a conceptual difficulty arises because the “treatment” and “control” group had differ-
ent minimum wage policies at baseline. The “treatment” of the federal minimum wage
increase forced the treatment states to increase their minimum wage rates towards the
minimum wage rates that prevailed in the control states.
This feature of the setting raises at least two distinct issues of interest. First, dif-
ferences in states’ baseline minimum wage rates may alter selection into employment.
Because the selection of our target group requires that an individual be employed for at
least one month at baseline, this margin may be affected. This can bias estimates of βp(t)
if the associated selection translates into differential employment trajectories. A straight-
forward way to provide evidence on this issue is to estimate our specification on samples
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that contain both the individuals with low baseline wage rates and the individuals who
lacked employment at baseline. We present estimates on such samples below.
Second, the analysis in Clemens and Wither (2014) is exposed to the concern that
the low-skilled individuals in the control group are “peculiar.” Our baseline approach
was to analyze samples of workers with baseline wage rates below $7.50. A benefit of
this approach is that it isolates a well targeted sample of very low-skilled individuals.
A potential concern, however, arises from the fact that some states in the control group
had baseline minimum wage rates that were higher than $7.50. The “control” group
thus consists disproportionately of sub-minimum wage workers (e.g., tipped workers).
If sub-minimum wage workers have different counterfactual employment trajectories
than near minimum wage workers, this difference between our treatment and control
groups could be a source of bias.
We address this potential bias by considering two alternative approaches to select-
ing our analysis samples. One alternative is to select samples based on the relationship
between an individuals’ average baseline wage and the minimum wage rate applicable
in their respective states. A second alternative is to select samples on the basis of indi-
viduals’ percentiles in their wage distributions. We show that the samples selected on
these bases are balanced with regards to the fraction of individuals earning less than
the minimum wage. We then show that selecting samples on these alternative bases has
essentially no effect on our estimates.5
5Our original working paper devoted significant attention to the separate possibility that the treat-
ment and control group may have differed in the extent to which their industries were exposed to shocks.
We explored this concern by controlling for time trends interacted with indicators for individuals’ modal
industry of employment at baseline. We similarly investigated the relevance of differences between the
treatment and control groups’ demographics by controlling for time trends interacted with indicator vari-
ables specific to each year of age, educational attainment, and gender.
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2 Sample Construction Choices
This section walks through the details of our construction of the average baseline
wage measure we use to select analysis samples. Multiple features of the data make the
ideal construction of an “average baseline wage” variable less obvious than one might
expect. A first issue is standard across wage measurement settings. Some wage rates
are reported as the wage rates of individuals who are paid on an hourly basis, while
some wage rates must be imputed as earnings divided by hours of work. This creates
a trade-off in that there is additional information in the measure of earnings divided by
hours, but that information is relatively prone to measurement error.
Two additional issues elevate the difficulty of navigating the first. The SIPP’s primary
hourly wage variable is a “reference period” variable. This contrasts with the SIPP’s
employment variables, which are monthly. The “reference period” refers to the four
month period about which a respondent is being questioned at the time of the interview.
If the respondent reports being employed at any time during the 4 month window in
question, the variable ejobcntr indicates employment during the reference period. If the
respondent further reports working for an hourly wage during the reference period, then
the variable tpyrate1 takes the value of that individual’s wage at his or her primary job.
A complication in using this information arises because a significant number of month-
specific observations code individuals as having a job (the employment status recode
variable, rmesr, is between 1 and 5), but as being outside the universe of the variable
ejobcntr (that is, ejobcntr = −1).
These issues generate two data processing questions. The first question is what use
should be made of earnings information for individuals who are employed but who are
coded as being out of the universe for ejobcntr and hence also for tpyrate1. The second
question is what use should be made of earnings information for individuals who are
coded as employed by both ejobcntr and rmesr, but for whom tpyrate1 = 0 because they
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are not paid on an hourly basis.6
The analysis below considers three degrees of utilization of wage rates imputed
as earnings divided by hours. Our baseline approach uses the earnings divided by
hours imputation to estimate wage rates in cases where the individual is employed
(ejobcntr and rmesr both indicate employment) and earnings are positive (tpearn > 0),
but tpyrate1 = 0. A second approach uses the earnings divided by hours imputation
in all cases in which the variable rmesr indicates that the individual is employed, but
tpyrate1 = 0. A third approach uses only the observations for which tpyrate1 takes non-
zero values. The code associated with the construction of each of these “baseline wage”
variables can be found in this paper’s appendix.
A separate question is how the information in a given measure of the “average base-
line wage” should be used to divide the sample into a “target” group and groups of indi-
viduals with higher skill levels. The analysis presented below adopts three approaches.
The baseline approach from Clemens and Wither (2014) defines the target group based
on an absolute nominal level of the average baseline wage. As discussed above, a criti-
cism that this approach encounters relates to the fact that the nominal ceiling we imposed
was beneath the minimum wage rates effective in California and Massachusetts during
our baseline period. Consequently, our “control” group consists disproportionately of
sub-minimum wage workers. One purpose of our alternative sample definitions is to
provide evidence that this imbalance has not biased our results.
The second approach we consider is to define the threshold relative to the minimum
wage rate effective in each state at baseline. Specifically, we define an alternative target
group to include all individuals whose average baseline wage rates were within $0.50
of the minimum wage rate effective in their state in January 2009. A third approach is
6Unfortunately, tpyrate1 takes a value of 0 for both those who are not paid on an hourly basis and
those who are truly working for no pay (e.g., as interns).
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based on percentiles. That is, we define the treatment and control group to include indi-
viduals in the bottom 13 percentiles of their respective states’ wage distributions.7 The
summary statistics presented in section 4 reveal that these alternative approaches elimi-
nate the imbalance in the treatment and control group members’ likelihood of working
at wage rates below their states’ effective minimums at baseline. An additional way to
achieve this is to simply raise the nominal ceiling so that it exceeds the minimum wage
rates effective in all states at baseline. None of these approaches significantly alter the
implications of our estimates of the effects of this period’s minimum wage changes on
employment.
3 Alternative “Target Group” Samples
The analysis presented below considers 5 distinct definitions of the “target” group
on which we estimate equation (1). The first is the baseline analyzed by Clemens and
Wither (2014). The wage measure for this sample uses information on observations that
are in the universe for the variable ejobcntr. The baseline target group is defined to
include individuals with average baseline wage rates less than $7.50.
The second definition utilizes an average baseline wage measure that incorporates
additional wage imputations. Specifically, it incorporates wage imputations for cases
that are outside of the universe for ejobcntr despite the individual being employed. Us-
ing this wage measure, the baseline target group is again defined to include individuals
with average baseline wage rates less than $7.50.
The third definition uses fewer wage imputations than the baseline. The average
7The baseline definition of the target group contains roughly 13 percent of the employed population
in the treatment states. The percentile-based definition is thus intended to equalize the control group
and treatment group along this margin. We use percentiles within the full sets of treatment and control
states, rather than within each state individually, due to sample size. Percentiles within small states are
less reliable proxies for an individual’s absolute skill level due to sample size.
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baseline wage measure is constructed using only the cases for which the wage variable
tpyrate1 is positive. Using this wage measure, the baseline target group is again defined
to include individuals with average baseline wage rates less than $7.50.
The fourth and fifth definitions return to the baseline definition of the average base-
line wage. These definitions differ in their use of this information for dividing the
sample. For the fourth definition, the target group consists of individuals whose av-
erage baseline wage is no more than $0.50 higher than their state’s effective minimum
wage rate in January 2009. The fifth definition is based on percentiles. The fifth target
group includes all individuals who were in the bottom 13 percentiles of the treatment
and control groups’ baseline wage distributions.8
4 Summary Statistics on the Alternative “Target” Samples
Table 3 presents baseline summary statistics on the 5 “target” samples described
above. Columns 1 and 2 describe the control group and treatment group, respectively, of
the baseline sample. Columns 3 through 10 present the same sets of summary statistics
for the 4 alternative definitions of the target group. The groups are presented in the
same order in which they were initially discussed above.
We focus on two aspects of these summary statistics. First, the second and third
variables summarized in the table reveal one of the imbalances that may be a source
of concern in our baseline analysis. They reveal that the baseline control group has a
relatively large fraction of individuals who were sub-minimum wage workers at base-
line.9 Because differences between sub-minimum wage workers and near minimum
8As noted above, this is equivalent to simply adding a few percentiles to the control group sample such
that the treatment and control group cover the same percentiles of their respective wage distributions.
9It is worth noting that it is by no means obvious that this particular imbalance is a genuine “threat” to
our estimates. The wage rates of all individuals in these samples reveal them to be quite low-skilled. The
key question is whether differences across the treatment and control group might generate differences in
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wage workers might generate different counterfactual employment trajectories, this dif-
ference is worth investigating further. Note that this imbalance is addressed by the
sample inclusion criteria adopted for target groups 4 and 5. In target groups 4 and
5, similar fractions of the treatment and control samples reported sub-minimum wage
rates at baseline. These samples are also more closely balanced on age, education, and
the probability of working for no pay at baseline.
A second issue involves variations in the extent of the federal minimum wage’s bite.
This is summarized by the first variable in the table, which describes the fraction of
baseline months in which individuals’ wage rates were between the old and new federal
minimum wage. The variations we emphasize are captured by the first set of regres-
sions reported in the following section. Target groups 4 and 5 involve definitions that
generate differential bite that moderately exceeds that associated with the baseline anal-
ysis sample. By contrast, target group 2 involves a definition under which the treatment
and control group are less differentiated along this margin. All else equal, we would
thus expect estimated employment effects to appear moderately larger than the baseline
when we analyze the 4th and 5th target groups, and to be moderately smaller than the
baseline when we analyze the 2nd target group.
5 Regression Analysis
This section is divided into four sets of regression estimates. Section 5.1 reports
estimates of equation (1) on each of the 5 “target” group samples discussed above. The
outcomes considered include a “first stage” likelihood of having a wage in the affected
range, the probability of employment, and the probability of either having no job or
working at a self-reported wage rate of 0. Section 5.2 presents estimates that, using our
their employment trajectories.
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5 approaches to dividing the population across skill groups, explore the relationship
between binding minimum wage increases and employment across the entirety of the
working age population. Section 5.3 presents evidence on whether our estimates are
sensitive to controlling for additional macroeconomic covariates. Section 5.4 presents
evidence on the sensitivity of Clemens and Wither’s (2014) baseline estimates to changes
in the panel balance criterion we apply.
5.1 Estimates across Target Samples
This section presents estimates of equation (1) on the 5 “target” group samples dis-
cussed above. Table 4 presents estimates of the relationship between binding minimum
wage increases and the probability that an individual reports a wage between $5.15 and
$7.25. The estimates thus describe the extent to which the “treatment” state sample was
bound by the increase in the federal minimum wage.
The estimate in column 1 reveals that, in the baseline sample, individuals in the
treatment states saw their probability of reporting an affected wage rate decline 16 per-
centage points more than individuals in control states. Estimates vary moderately across
the 4 supplemental samples. For the group in column 2, the differential change was 13
percentage points. This group, which has a moderately larger sample than the base-
line group, is less intensively treated than the baseline group. For the remaining three
groups, the differential changes is moderately higher than in the case of the baseline
group. These groups are thus moderately more intensively treated by the minimum
wage change than is the baseline group.
Panel A of table 5 presents estimates of the effect of binding minimum wage increases
on employment. Column 1 reports the Clemens and Wither (2014) baseline. It reveals
that, conditional on the magnitude of states’ house price declines, employment declined
6 percentage points more among low-skilled individuals in treatment states relative to
16
control states. Column 2 reports a smaller estimate of just under 4 percentage points.
Note that because this sample is larger, the estimates translate into similar changes in
the full-population’s employment rate. This reflects the fact that the sample in column
2 was, as noted above, less intensively treated than the baseline group. The estimates
in columns 3 through 5 range from 5.4 percentage points to 7.7 percentage points, with
the largest estimate coming from the sample that, as shown in table 4, was the most
intensively treated. Adjusted for the intensity of treatment observed in table 4, the
estimates are thus quite similar across approaches to assembling the target group.
Panel B of table 5 presents estimates of the effect of binding minimum wage increases
on the probability of either having no job or working for no pay, as in an internship. The
pattern of estimates is quite similar to that observed in panel A. Estimated medium run
effects range from 6.2 percentage points to 8.3 percentage points.
Tables 6 and 7 present estimates that involve two additional alterations to the sam-
ple’s composition. First, the estimates in table 6 apply the SIPP’s sample weights. The
SIPP’s sampling design is such that weighting does not serve an obvious purpose in this
setting. The SIPP is designed to oversample low income households, which is more or
less the basis along which our baseline analysis sample is selected. Weights are thus
relevant for generating an appropriate estimate of the fraction of the U.S. population
our low-skilled sample represents. Within that sample, however, the SIPP’s design is not
such that weighting corrects for a dimension along which the sample is unrepresenta-
tive.10 The application of sample weights has little effect on our results.
Second, the estimates in table 7 involve two changes to the sequence of data cleaning
operations. The first change effectively alters the panel balance criterion. Specifically,
10This can be contrasted with the sampling design of the Current Population Survey. The Current
Population Survey (CPS) over samples individuals in small states relative to individuals in large states.
Equally weighting the observations in the CPS thus yields a weighting scheme that corresponds with
neither an equal weighting of all states nor a nationally representative weighting of the individuals in the
sample.
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it requires that an individual appear for at least 36 months of the entire SIPP panel
rather than for at least 36 months during the 4 years of the analysis period. Second, in
our baseline data cleaning procedures we censored the monthly earnings variable at 0
before imputing wage rates on the basis of earnings divided by hours. In constructing
the samples analyzed in table 7, we effectively omitted this step in the data cleaning
process. The results in table 7 reveal that these choices have modest effects on the
estimates.
The similarity of the estimates across a variety of approaches to selecting the “target”
sample provides evidence on two points of interest. First, it highlights that our estimates
are not particularly sensitive to reasonable alternative choices in the use of wage-related
information available in the SIPP. Second, it provides evidence that our estimates were
not driven by the fact that a disproportionate share of the individuals in our control
group sample were sub-minimum wage workers rather than near-minimum wage work-
ers. Both sets of workers were quite low-skilled and, the evidence suggests, had similar
counterfactual employment trajectories. Evidence in the following subsections further
supports this claim.
5.2 Estimates across the Skill Distribution
This section presents estimates that, using our 5 alternative approaches to dividing
the population across skill groups, explore the relationship between binding minimum
wage increases and employment across the entirety of the working age population. For
clarity, consider table 8, which replicates estimates that initially appeared in Clemens
and Wither (2014). Column 1 presents an estimate of equation (1) on a sample consist-
ing of individuals who lacked employment throughout the baseline period. Column 2
presents the estimate involving the “target” group, which also appeared in the first col-
umn of table 8. In column 3 the sample combines the samples from columns 1 and 2. The
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remaining columns present estimates that involve the remainder of the population ages
16 to 64. The sample in column 4includes individuals with average baseline wage rates
between $7.50 and $8.50. The sample in column 5 includes individuals with average
baseline wage rates between $8.50 and $10.00. The sample in column 6 includes indi-
viduals with average baseline wage rates above $10.00. Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12 present
similarly structured sets of estimates associated with the four alternative approaches to
dividing the working age population across skill groups.
The estimates in tables 8 through 12 provide evidence on two points of interest.
First, Zipperer (2016) and an anonymous referee interpreted our baseline analysis as
susceptible to the concern that it does not account for the minimum wage’s potential
effects on entry into employment. If a minimum wage increase leads individuals to
enter the labor force, the argument goes, the estimates associated with our target group
may be partially offset by employment gains among those who were unemployed at
baseline. The estimates in columns 1 and 3 of tables 8 through 12 provide evidence that
this is not the case. Binding minimum wage increases were associated with declines in
employment entry among individuals who were unemployed at baseline. Combining
this sample with each table’s “target” sample generates the results one would tend to
expect based on the samples analyzed separately. The implied contributions to declines
in the employment rate across the full population ages 16 to 64 is substantial in all cases.
Estimates associated with higher skill groups provide evidence relevant to the valid-
ity of the estimated effects on employment among low-skilled individuals. The “effect”
of binding minimum wage increases on employment among the groups labeled as “Mid-
dle” and “High” skilled are economically quite close to 0. One estimate is statistically
distinguishable from 0 at the 0.10 level, and the others are indistinguishable from 0 at
all conventional significance levels. The differential employment declines we estimate
among individuals in the “target” group are thus not associated with differential em-
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ployment declines among groups higher in the skill distribution.
Among the estimates associated with “High” skilled groups, the one marginally sig-
nificant estimate involves the sample selected on the basis of individuals’ percentiles in
their respective groups’ wage distributions. We take this as suggestive evidence that
estimates involving samples selected on the basis of percentiles are more prone to bias
than estimates associated with either our baseline approach or with selecting the sam-
ple based on the distance between individuals’ baseline wage rates and their respective
states’ minimum wage rates. In retrospect, this is not entirely surprising. Individuals
in upper percentiles of the unbound states’ wage distributions have moderately higher
average educational attainment and baseline wage rates than do their counterparts in
bound states. While selection on the basis of percentiles strikes us as being a natural
approach to consider, other approaches may be superior for this reason.
5.3 Robustness to the Inclusion of More Macroeconomic Controls
Table 13 presents estimates in which we augment the regressions reported in panel
A of table 5 with additional controls for variations in macroeconomic conditions. Specif-
ically, we augment these regressions with controls for aggregate income per capita (in
thousands of dollars), for the state unemployment rate, and for the BEA’s construction
output index. The inclusion of these covariates has essentially no effect on the point
estimates, which shift by less than 5 percent in all cases.
The appendix of Clemens and Wither (2014) reports a similar analysis of the robust-
ness of our column 1 baseline to the inclusion of a variety of macroeconomic controls.
This evidence underlay our decision to organize our analysis around a baseline that
controlled exclusively for the house price index. Note that this decision was not based
on an ex ante judgment that the house price index is a particularly special control vari-
able. Instead, it reflects an ex post assessment that additional proxies for variations in
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macroeconomic conditions were, in practice, largely redundant. The house price index
has the additional benefit of being a more plausibly exogenous control variable than the
other proxies for variations in macroeconomic conditions. The recent minimum wage
literature has been relatively loose in using variables like the aggregate unemployment
rate or aggregate employment as controls in spite of the fact that information on em-
ployment among low-skilled individuals is contained directly in these variables.11 As
table 13 shows, our estimates are robust to incorporating controls of this form as well.
5.4 Sample Attrition and Alternative Panel Balance Criteria
Table 14 presents estimates on samples for which we alter our panel balance criterion.
Significant sample attrition occurred over the course of the 2008 SIPP sample. For our
baseline analysis sample, we required that an individual appear for at least 36 out of the
48 months in our sample window. The criteria applied to construct the samples analyzed
in table 14 include 12 months, 24 months, 36 months, and a fully balanced panel of 48
months. The estimates reveal that altering the panel balance criterion has little effect
on the estimates of interest. The “post 2” employment estimates range from -5.5 to -6.6
percentage points. The estimated changes in the probability of having no earnings range
from 7.1 percentage points to 8.2 percentage points.
Figure 6 presents evidence on whether attrition patterns correlate with the employ-
ment changes we estimate. The analysis involves estimates of equation (1) in which the
time periods correspond with individual months. The base month relative to which all
changes are estimated is March 2008, which falls a month prior to the period we coded
earlier as the Transition period. The blue dots in figure 6 correspond with the differential
evolution of employment (panel A) or the “no earnings” outcome (panel B). The green
11This mechanical relationship between the dependent variable and macroeconomic control variables
could be eliminated by taking the straightforward step of constructing the control variable as an unem-
ployment or employment rate among skill groups or industries outside of the group under analysis.
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Xs correspond with the differential evolution of the probability that an observation had
to be “filled in” because it is missing due to sample attrition.12
The estimates in figure 6 reveal that there is a very weak correlation between attrition
patterns and the differential changes in employment and the “no earnings” outcome.
The figure shows that the estimated effects on employment and on the “no earnings”
outcome had fully emerged as of July 2010. As of this time, attrition in the bound and
unbound state samples was the same. A modest amount of differential attrition appears
to emerge over the sample’s final year. Only one of the monthly coefficients in the
“missing” regression has an associated p-value less than 0.05.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents analysis that complements results originally reported in Clemens
and Wither (2014). The results speak to several threats to which, absent further infor-
mation, our earlier analysis is potentially subject. We conclude by discussing several
dimensions of our analysis and summarizing their implications.
The current paper focuses largely on issues related to the composition of our anal-
ysis samples. The analysis in sub-section 5.1 shows that our conclusions are robust to
considering a range of alternative approaches to constructing our analysis sample. This
includes approaches that account for potential differences between sub-minimum wage
workers and near-minimum wage workers. More generally, the analysis provides ev-
idence that our results are not dependent on the particulars of our data cleaning and
sample construction procedures. Finally, we complement our analysis of employment
exit among low-skilled individuals who were employed at baseline with analysis of in-
12To construct this variable we first “filled” the data set to generate a balanced panel containing all of
the missing person-month observation lines. We then assigned missing observations to the modal state in
which the individual resided at baseline.
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dividuals who lacked employment at baseline. We find that binding minimum wage
increases modestly reduced transitions into employment among the latter group over
the period we analyze.
Beyond issues of sample composition, the current paper supplements Clemens and
Wither (2014) with regards to the information readers can use to assess the potential
biases posed by variations in macroeconomic conditions. The unadjusted data in tables
1 and 2, most entries of which can also be found in Clemens (2017a,b), serve this pur-
pose. These tables summarize variations in comprehensive indicators of employment,
aggregate income, and housing market conditions as they varied between the “bound”
and “unbound” states that constitute the “treatment” and “control” groups in our anal-
ysis. These data are quite clear that negative macroeconomic shocks were more severe in
our control group than in our treatment group. Macroeconomic conditions would thus
tend to bias unadjusted estimates of the employment effects of this period’s minimum
wage increases towards positive values. Arguments to the contrary must rationalize why
sources of negative bias left no trace in standard indicators of the strength of the housing
market, the labor market, or the macroeconomy.
We present additional evidence regarding potential threats to our baseline analysis
from omitted variables. In sub-sections 5.2 and 5.3, we present two types of evidence
against the relevance of fairly broad threats to our interpretation of our estimates. The
evidence in section 5.2 shows that, when comparing bound states to unbound states, the
differential employment decline occurred exclusively among the very least skilled work-
ers and among individuals who were not employed at baseline. There is no evidence
of differential employment declines among individuals who are either high skilled or
who have skills that are modestly greater than the skills of the individuals in our “tar-
get” analysis samples. If our estimates are biased, the bias would have to arise from
forces that have remarkably concentrated effects on minimum and near-minimum wage
23
workers.
The analysis presented in sub-section 5.3 provides additional evidence that our esti-
mates are not driven by the effects of observable changes in macroeconomic conditions
on employment among low-skilled individuals. We are able to rule out forces that reveal
themselves through the relationship between low-skilled employment and aggregate in-
come per capita or through additional proxies (e.g., the BEA’s construction output index)
for exposure to the shocks that were relevant during the period under analysis.
Across the analyses we report, we are thus able to rule out a broad range of sources
of potential bias. Remaining sources of bias would have to involve factors that are not
captured by the labor market, macroeconomic, and housing market indicators for which
we have controlled directly. They would simultaneously have to be factors that have no
detectable effect on employment among individuals with skills that are only modestly
greater than the skills of minimum wage workers. These aspects of our statistical anal-
ysis, which builds on the unadjusted data from tables 1 and 2, guide our reading of the
evidence.
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Figures and Tables
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Figure 1: States Bound by the 2008 and 2009 Federal Minimum Wage Increases:
The map differentiates states on the basis of whether they were fully or partially bound by the July 2007,
2008 and 2009 increases in the federal minimum wage. I define states as fully bound if their January 2008
minimum wage, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), was less than $6.55. Such states were
at least partially bound by the July 2008 increase in the federal minimum and fully bound by the July 2009
increase from $6.55 to $7.25.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the Average Minimum Wage in Bound and Unbound States:
As in the previous figure, states are defined as fully bound if they were reported by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) to have had a minimum wage less than $6.55 in January 2008. Such states were at least
partially bound by the July 2008 increase in the federal minimum and fully bound by the July 2009 increase
from $6.55 to $7.25. Effective monthly minimum wage data were taken from the detailed replication
materials associated with Meer and West (Forthcoming). Within each group of states, the average effective
minimum wage is weighted by state population. The dashed vertical line indicates the May 2007 passage
of the federal minimum wage increases, while the solid vertical line indicates the timing of the July 2009
implementation of the final increase from $6.55 to $7.25.
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Evolution of Construction Employment
Panel A
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Figure 4: Evolution of Construction Employment:
Note: The figure presents the evolution of construction employment as estimated using data from the
basic CPS. The series in panel A reports construction employment as a fraction of total employment. The
series in panel B reports construction employment as a fraction of the working age population.
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Evolution of Construction Output
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Figure 5: Evolution of Construction Employment:
Note: The figure presents the evolution of construction output as reported by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). The series in panel A are population weighted averages of the BEA’s regional accounts
construction quantity index. The series in panel B renormalizes the indices to take a value of 100 in the
first quarter of 2006.
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Evidence on Sample Attrition
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Figure 6: Evidence on Sample Attrition:
Note: The figure reports fully dynamic estimates of the minimum wage’s effects on employment alongside
estimates of differential sample attrition. The green X’s correspond with the attrition estimates of the
probability that a person-month observation was missing. The blue dots in the top (bottom) panel are
estimates of the effect of binding minimum wage increases on the probability of employment (having no
earnings).
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A Wage Variable Construction
*==============================================================
*== Create wage and average baseline wage variables ====
*==============================================================
gen hours = ehrsall
replace hours = 0 if ehrsall<0
gen tothours = hours*rmwkwjb
gen hourwage = tpearn/tothours if ejobcntr >=0
gen hrwage = tpyrate1 if ejobcntr >=0
replace hrwage = hourwage if tpyrate1==0 & !missing(hourwage)
replace hrwage = round(hrwage,.01)
gen affectedwage = hrwage>=5.15 & hrwage<7.25
gen hourwagealt = tpearn/tothours if employed ==1
gen hrwagealt = tpyrate1 if employed == 1
replace hrwagealt = hourwagealt if tpyrate1==0 & !missing(hourwagealt)
replace hrwagealt = round(hrwagealt,.01)
gen hrwagealtB = tpyrate1 if ejobcntr >=0 & tpyrate1 != 0
replace hrwagealtB = round(hrwagealtB,.01)
gen wagevar = hrwage if Post==0
egen avewage = mean(wagevar), by(personid)
gen wagevaralt = hrwagealt if Post==0
egen avewagealt = mean(wagevaralt), by(personid)
gen wagevaraltB = hrwagealtB if Post==0
egen avewagealtB = mean(wagevaraltB), by(personid)
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B Identification of Bound States and Division of Sample Period
*==================================================
*===== Identify Bound States and =====
*==================================================
preserve
use "Employment Replication/Data/Macro/MinimumWageRatesByStateAndMonth.dta", clear
keep if year==2008 & month==1
keep statefip mw
replace mw = round(mw,.01)
rename mw mw2008
save "Employment Replication/Data/Macro/Jan2008MWs.dta", replace
restore
merge m:1 statefip using "Employment Replication/Data/Macro/Jan2008MWs.dta", nogenerate
gen Treatment = mw2008<6.55
gen Post = time>=200908
gen Post1 = time>=200908 & time<=201007
gen Post2 = time>=201008
gen Transition = time>=200905 & time<=200907
gen Period = 0
replace Period = 1 if Transition==1
replace Period = 2 if Post1==1
replace Period = 3 if Post2==1
gen Treatment_Post = Treatment*Post
gen Treatment_Post_1 = Treatment*Post1
gen Treatment_Post_2 = Treatment*Post2
gen Treatment_Trans = Treatment*Transition
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C Initial Data Cleaning and Variable Construction
*==================================================
*===== Initial Cleaning =====
*==================================================
egen personid = group(ssuid epppnum)
drop if missing(personid)
drop if tage>=65
drop if tage<16
gen time = 100*year+month
drop if time<=200807
drop if time>201207
foreach inc in tpearn {
replace ‘inc’ = ‘inc’/CPI
replace ‘inc’ = 0 if ‘inc’<0
replace ‘inc’ = 7500 if ‘inc’ > 7500 & ‘inc’ != .
}
egen personidcount = count(personid), by(personid)
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